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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR
DAMAGES ON THEORY OF BREACH OF TRUST
Indians-Reservation Lands: Indian tribes and individuals may recover damages for government mismanagement of Indian lands and
resources. United States v. Mitchell 11, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (1983).

INTRODUCTION
Individuals owning interests in allotted lands on the Quinalt Indian
Reservation,' an unincorporated association of allottees, and the Quinalt
Tribe filed actions in the Court of Claims2 seeking to recover damages
from the federal government for alleged mismanagement of timber lands
on the reservation. Plaintiffs asserted that this mismanagement constituted
a breach of the United States' fiduciary duty to the Indians as trustee
under various federal statutes and regulations. 3 The Court of Claims held
that the General Allotment Act4 imposed a fiduciary duty on the United
States to manage timber resources properly and thereby provided the
necessary authority for recovery of damages against the United States. 5
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Claims, finding that
the Tucker' and Indian Tucker7 Acts are "only ...jurisdictional act(s)";
they do not "create any substantial right enforceable against the United
States for money damages."' Because the General Allotment Act "created
only a limited trust relationship between the United States and the allottees
that does not impose any duty upon the Government to manage timber
resources," 9 the Supreme Court found the Indians had no right to recover
money damages from the federal government.'" The Court concluded that
some source other than the General Allotment Act must be found for the
1. The Reservation was established in 1873 by an Executive Order setting aside about 190,000
acres on the Pacific Ocean side of the Olympic Penninsula. Ninety-eight percent of the Reservation
was covered with dense coniferous forests.
2. Mitchell v. United States, 519 F.2d 1300 (Ct.Cl. 1979) (en bane), rev'd, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
3. Statutes include timber management statutes, 25 U.S.C. § 406-407 (1982); regulations and
sustained yield, 25 U.S.C. §466 (1982); various federal statutes governing road building and rightsof-way, 25 U.S.C. §§318a, 323-325 (1982); and the General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. §§331358 (1982).

4. 25 U.S.C. §§331-358 (1982).
5. 591 F.2d at 1302.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1982). Section 24 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505
(1982), provides tribal claimants the same access to the Court of Claims provided to individual
claimants by 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).
8. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
9. Id. at 542.

10. Id. at 546.
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Indians to recover damages for government mismanagement of timber
resources" (Mitchell I).
On remand, the Indians argued to the Court of Claims that federal
fiduciary responsibility is created or recognized by three statutes: 25
U.S.C. §§406-407 (timber sales); 25 U.S.C. §466 (regulations and
sustained yield); and 25 U.S.C. §§318a, 323-325 (rights-of-way). The
Court of Claims held that these statutes did give federal officials full
authority to manage Indian forest property and land, thereby creating a
fiduciary relationship. The Court of Claims concluded that plaintiffs could
recover, on proof, for breach of this 2fiduciary obligation and obtain compensation provided by the statutes.'
In a 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Court of Claims.
The Court found that the United States can be held accountable in money
damages for breaches of trust in connection with its management of forest
resources on allotted lands on the Quinalt Reservation 3 (Mitchell II).
This note will discuss the possible effects of Mitchell II on federal
management of Indian lands and resources. Only the federal-Indian trust
relationship will be discussed. The jurisdictional and sovereign immunity
issues of this case have been addressed in other articles.' 4
THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP
The Mitchell II Court found that the timber management statutes, 5 and
the timber management regulations" gave the federal government full
responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of
Indians.' 7 The Court of Claims found these statutes to have a common
thread: (1) they deal with Indian-owned property; (2) are managed and
controlled by federal officials as fiduciaries; (3) are in the express interest
of and for the benefit of the Indians; and (4) reflect Congress' intent for
the Indians to obtain the financial benefits.' 8 The Court of Claims and
the U.S. Supreme Court found that a fiduciary relationship had therefore
11. Id.
12. Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct.CI. 1981) (en banc).
13. United States v. Mitchell, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983).
14. See Hughes, Can the Trustee Be Sued for its Breach? The Sad Saga of United States v.
Mitchell, 26 S.D. L. REV. 447 (1981); Newton, Enforcing the Federal-IndianTrust Relationship
After Mitchell, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 635 (1982); Note, Indian Breach of Trust Suits, 33 RUTGERS
L. REV. 502 (1981); and Orme, TuckerAct Jurisdiction Over Breach of Trust Claims, 1979 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 855.
15. 25 U.S.C. §§ 406-407, and 466 (1982). Breach of trust claims also were alleged under the
statutes governing Indian funds and government fees, 25 U.S.C. §§ 162a, 413 (1982).
16. 25 C.F.R. § 141 (1981).
17. Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2972.
18. Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d at 273.
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been established and the contours of the United States' fiduciary responsibilities defined.1 9
This fiduciary relationship was first established in the federal government's dealings with Indian tribes through treaties. 2" Indian tribes frequently were recognized in treaties as sovereign powers with title to the
land which they occupied. 2' Many of the terms familiar to international
treaties were used in Indian treaties."Z Mutual pledges of peace and friendship,' as well as provisions for passports, 4 extradition,'2 and restrictions
on foreign relations26 are found in many of the early treaties.
Indian tribes were not recognized by the federal government as foreign
nations, however. Numerous treaty provisions established their status as
dependent nations.2 7 Indian tribes often ceded land to the United States
in return for goods and services.2 Certain land areas also were set aside
for the Indians' continued use. When the federal government failed to
19. Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d at 270 and Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2972.
20. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution gives the President the power to make treaties
with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.
Congress passed the Act of Aug. 20, 1789, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 54, to defray the expense of negotiating
and treating with Indian tribes.
21. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). The original inhabitants were
admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession
of it, and to use it according to their own discretion. Their right to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, was necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery
gave exclusive title to those who made it.
22. See, e.g., Treaty with the Comanches and Wichetaws, Aug. 24, 1835, art. 9, 7 Stat. 474,
475 (the United States desired that "perfect peace shall exist between the nations or tribes named"
and the Republic of Mexico); Treaty with the Creeks, Aug. 9, 1814, preamble, 7 Stat. 120 (some
of the Creek Nation acted "contrary to national faith" and suffered themselves to be instigated to
violations of their national honor).
23. E.g., Treaty with the Sacs, May 13, 1816, 7 Stat. 141; Treaty with the Choctaws, Jan. 3,
1786, 7 Stat. 21 (Treaty at Hopewell); Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, art. 2, 7 Stat.
13.
24. E.g., Treaty with the Cherokees, July 2, 1791, art. 9, 7 Stat. 39, 40; Treaty with the Creeks,
Aug. 7, 1790, art. 7, 7 Stat. 35, 37.
25. Treaty with the Sisseeton and Wahpaton Bands of Dakotas or Sioux, June 19, 1858, art. 6,
12 Stat. 1037, 1039, Treaty with the Poncas, March 12, 1858, art. 7, 12 Stat. 997, 1000; Treaty
with the Choctaws, Sept. 27, 1830, art. 8, 7 Stat. 33, 334 (treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek).
26. Treaty with the Poncars, June 9, 1825, art. 3, 7 Stat. 247, 248; Treaty with the Chickasaws,
Jan. 10, 1786, art. 8, 7 Stat. 24, 25; Treaty with the Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, art. 9, 7 Stat. 18.
27. Provisions often provided for the protection of Indian tribes from other tribes and all other
persons by the United States. E.g., Treaty with the Kaskaskias, Aug. 13, 1803, art. 2, 7 Stat. 78;
Treaty with the Ottoways and others, Nov. 17, 1807, art. 7, 7 Stat. 105; Treaty with the Creeks,
Aug. 7, 1790, art. 2, 7 Stat. 35. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1831, found that all Indian tribes are
"domestic dependent nations" in regard to the United States, rendering these kind of provisions
unnecessary. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 217 (1831).
28. Goods and services included farming utensils, cattle, blacksmith and such agricultural assistance as the President may deem expedient (Treaty with the Chippewas, Sept. 24, 1819, art. 8, 7
Stat. 203); 200 cattle, 200 hogs, plus 2000 pounds of iron, 1000 pounds of steel and 1000 pounds
of tobacco annually, and the assistance of laborers (Treaty with the Miamis, Oct. 23, 1826, art. 4,
7 Stat. 300); and the payment of annuities in the form of money, merchandise, provisions, or
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fulfill the terms of the treaty 29 or was unable or unwilling to prevent
states,3" or white people, 1 from violating treaty rights of the Indians,
enforcement of the treaty terms did not occur until the courts and Congress
recognized that the United States had an obligation to protect Indian
tribes.32
Indian treaties are recognized as part of the supreme law of the land33
and "regarded, in courts of justice, as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative
provision. ' '3 4 All Indian treaty provisions, except those abrogated by
Congress,35 remain operative today. In construing Indian treaties, the
courts have required that treaties be liberally construed to favor Indians,3 6
that ambiguous expressions in treaties be resolved in favor of Indians,"
and that treaties be construed as the Indians would have understood
them.38 These canons of construction were developed by the courts in
recognition of the disadvantaged position which tribes occupied in relation
to the federal government during treaty negotiations.
The policy of Indian treaty making ceased in 1871." The federal government, however, continued to make agreements for land cessions. Treaties and agreements are recognized as having the same legal force,4° except
domestic animals, at the option of the Indians (Treaty with the Osages, June 2, 1825, art. 3, 7 Stat.
240).
29. KINNEY, A CONTINENT LOST-A CIVILIZATION WON 68 (1937) (hereinafter cited as
KINNEY); HOOPES, INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE FAR WEST 180, 218, 219 (1932) (hereinafter cited as HOOPES); and
SCMECKEBIER, THE OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES, AND ORGANIZATION 62 (1927) (hereinafter cited as SCMECKEBIER).
30. KINNEY, supra note 30 at 71.
31. KINNEY, supra note 30 at 148, 149, 174, 184, 208; HOOPES, supra note 30 at 84, 226,
228-232; SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 30 at 44.
32. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 525, 559 (1832).
33. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559, and United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93
U.S. 188, 196 (1876).
34. Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1828).
35. The power of Congress to abrogate provisions of Indian treaties unilaterally was upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 533 (1903).
36. E.g. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-432 (1943); Choate v. Trapp, 224
U.S. 665, 675 (1912); United States v. Walker River Irrig. Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 337 (9th Cir. 1939).
37. E.g. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 176 (1973); Carpenter v. Shaw,
280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-577 (1908).
38. E.g. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); United States v. Shoshone
Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899).
39. The Appropriation Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566, R.S. §2079, 25 U.S.C.
§71 (1982).
40. Agreements with Indian tribes are interpreted according to the same principles as treaties.
Martin v. Lewallen, 276 U.S. 58, 64 (1928). They can be modified, except that the rights created
by carrying the agreement into effect cannot be impaired. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 671
(1912).
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that treaties were ratified by the Senate, while agreements required the
approval of both houses of Congress. 4'
Congressional enactments provided for governmental acquisition of
Indian lands and resources after treaty making ceased. The first general
statutory provision relating to disposition of Indian resources is found in
a paragraph of section 2 of the Act of March 3, 1883.42 The Act provides
that the proceeds of all pasturage and sales of timber, coal, or other
product of any Indian reservation are to be deposited in a treasury for
the benefit of the tribe.43 The funds then are to be made available for
tribal use as determined by the Secretary of Interior. 4
In 1887, Congress enacted the General Allotment Act 45 which allowed
the federal government to parcel out tribal lands to individual tribal members.' The federal government held the allotment in trust for twenty-five
years or longer.47 During the trust period, any purchase money paid to
the tribe for surplus land remaining after the allotments were made was
required to be held in trust for the benefit of the tribe.48 At the end of
the trust period, the federal government conveyed a patent in fee to the
allottee or his heirs.49 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,5° ended
the practice of allotments and extended indefinitely the trust period for
existing allotments still in trust. The Act also authorized the Secretary of
Interior to restore to tribal ownership any "surplus" lands acquired from
the tribes under the General Allotment Act, so long as third parties had
not acquired rights to that land. 5'
The fiduciary relationship between the federal government and the
Indian tribes is neither stated expressly nor is it defined in statutes that
require the federal government to manage Indian lands and resources.
The nature of a fiduciary duty developed as a judicial and administrative
41. See Act of March 8, 1871, ch. 18, 16 Stat. 66.
42. Ch. 141, 22 Stat. 582, 590, 25 U.S.C. § 155 (1982).
43. Id.
44. This provision was later supplemented by the Act of Feb. 16, 1889 (ch. 172, 25 Stat. 673,
25 U.S.C. § 196 (1982)), authorizing the sale of dead timber on Indian reservations under such
regulations as the President might prescribe.
45. 25 U.S.C. §§331-358 (1982).

46. 25 U.S.C. §331 (1982).
47. 25 U.S.C. §348 (1982).
48. Id.

49. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1982).
50. 25 U.S.C. §§461-479 (1982).
51. 25 U.S.C. § 463 (1982). Various statutes have been enacted since the passage of the General
Allotment Act that allow the federal government to acquire Indian lands and resources. See, e.g.,
Act of March 3, 1909, ch. 263, 35 Stat. 781, 782 (acquisition of lands for reservoirs or materials);
Act of Feb 8, 1887, ch. 119, as added June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 327 (sale of lands within
reclamation projects); Act of Oct. 9, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-472, §§ 86 Stat. 788 (Coeur d'Alenes);

Act of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-413, 78 Stat. 387 (Eastern Shawnees).
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doctrine during the nineteenth century. 2 The trust responsibility was first
53
articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
and Worcester v. Georgia.5 4 Marshall analogized the relationship between
the United States and the Indian tribes as resembling that of a "ward to
his guardian," stating, however, the relationship was unique.55 He characterized Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" and declared that
all federal legislation, from the beginning, had considered the Indian
nations as "distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all lands
within these boundaries,56 which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed
by the United States."
Marshall's guardianship or trust responsibility concept was later employed by the Court in United States v. Kagama57 to justify the imposition
of federal regulations over Indian reservations. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act,5 8 relying principally on the
government's fiduciary duty to protect its Indian wards. The federal relationship to the Indian tribes, however, no longer resembled that of a
guardianship. The Court in Kagama held that a guardianship actually
existed. 9
Executive officials administering Indian property have been held to the
ordinary standards of a private fiduciary. 6' In Creek Nation v. United
States,6 the tribe filed an action in the Court of Claims under a special
jurisdictional act to adjudicate all legal and equitable claims that the tribe
may have had against the United States arising under the treaties or acts
of Congress.62 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
Claims award to the tribe for money damages against the United States
for lands excluded from their reservation and sold to non-Indians following an incorrect federal survey of reservation boundaries.6 3 The Court
based its decision on the federal trust doctrine, finding that the tribe was
52. R. P. CHAMBERS, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY 6 (1972) (available in University of New Mexico Law School
Library).
53. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
54. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
55. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
56. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
57. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
58. Act of March 3, 1885, sec. 9, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242
(1982)).
59. 118 U.S. at 383-384.
60. E.g., United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973); Seminole Nation v. United States,
316 U.S. 286 (1942); Creek Nation v. United States, 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
61. 78 Ct.CI. 474 (1933).
62. Act of May 20, 1924, ch. 162, 43 Stat. 133.
63. 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
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a dependent Indian community under the guardianship of the United
States, and therefore, its property and affairs were subject to the control
and management of the government.'
Other. decisions of the Supreme Court reviewing the legality of administrative conduct in managing Indian properties have held executive
officials to a "moral obligation of the highest responsibility and trust"
and "the most exacting fiduciary standards." 6 5 In Seminole Nation v.
United States,' the tribe brought an action against the United States for
breach of fiduciary duty growing out of treaty obligations. Federal officials
were alledgedly paying to the tribal council sums it was obligated by
treaty to pay per capita to individual members. Plaintiffs claimed that
these federal officials knew that the council was corrupt and would divert
the funds paid to it to its own use. The Court reviewed the administrative
conduct of the federal officials involved and held the federal officials
liable to the tribal members for the sums paid to the tribal council.
The Supreme Court and several other federal courts have consistently
recognized "that the existence of a trust relationship between the United
States and an Indian or Indian tribe includes as a fundamental incident
the right of an injured beneficiary to sue the trustee for damages resulting
from a breach of the trust."67 Monetary damages have been limited to
tangible direct injuries to property or to direct losses due to denials of
required services. 68 The Mitchell II Court is the first court to grant damages69
for breaches of the ordinary standards applicable to a private fiduciary.
64. Id. at I10.
65. United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316
U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
66. 82 Ct.CI. 135 (1935).
67. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 295-300 (1942); United States
v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-110 (1935); Moose v. United States, 674 F.2d 1277, 1281 (9th
Cir. 1982); Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d 1332, 1335 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1078 (1980); Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Mancester Band
of Porno Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1243-1248 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Coast
Indian Community v. United States, 152-156, 550 F.2d 639, 652-654 (Ct.CI. 1977); CheyenneArapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390, 1392 (Ct.CI. 1975); Mason v. United States, 461
F.2d 1364, 1372-1373 (Ct.CI. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 391 (1973); Navajo Tribe
v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 322 (Ct.CI. 1966); Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. United States, 174
Ct.CI. 483, 490-491 (1966); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 102 Ct.CI. 555, 562 (1945);
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 101 Ct.CI. 10, 18-20 (1944).
68. See, e.g., Coast Indian Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639 (Ct.CI. 1977); CheyenneArapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct.CI. 1975); Quinalt Allottee Ass'n v. United
States, 485 F.2d 1391 (Ct.CI. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974); Capoeman v. United States,
440 F.2d 1002 (Ct.CI. 1971); Navajo Tribe v. United States, 364 F.2d 320 (Ct.CI. 1966); Klamath
& Modoc Tribes v. United States, 174 Ct.C1. 483 (1966).
69. The substantive claim for monetary compensation is created by the statute(s) which formed
and continued a general trust and laid down specific duties. The right to sue the Government in the
Court of Claims was completed by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Duncan v. United States,
667 F.2d 36, 44 (Ct.CI. 1981).
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MITCHELL H
Before Mitchell II was decided, the federal government's fiduciary
duties seemed to involve (a) a duty of reasonable care in the protection
and preservation of the trust res, and (b) a duty of loyalty, with an attendant
prohibition against self-dealing or misappropriating the trust res. 70 Damages were awarded for two types of standard trust claims-losses due to
mismanagement of trust funds71 and losses due to mismanagement of
tangible trust properties. 72 The Mitchell II Court, in reviewing the statutes
and regulations and prior case law, concluded that an express trust had
been established by the statutes and, because a private express trust
normally imports a right to recover damages for breach, Congress necessarily must have authorized73recovery of damages for failure to perform
the statutory duties properly.
The Mitchell 1I Court set forth a two-part test that must be met before
money damages may be awarded for a breach of trust claim:
1. Is there a statute(s) that imposes a fiduciary responsibility on the
federal government to manage the Indian land or resource at issue?
2. Does the statute(s) confer a substantive right to recover monetary
damages?
Under the Mitchell II analysis, the statute at issue must "clearly establish" the fiduciary obligations of the government in the management
and operation of Indian lands and resources.74 The Mitchell I Court recognized that the General Allotment Act created a trust relationship between the United States and Indian allottees, but concluded that the trust
relationship was limited.75 Section 5 of the Act provides that the United
States "does and will hold the land . . . in trust for the sole use and
benefit of the" allottee.76 The Court found that this language, read in pari
materia with other sections of the Act,' indicated that the allottee and
not the United States was to manage the land. 7 The Court also reviewed
the legislative history of the Act and found that Congress did not intend
to impose a fiduciary responsibility on the United States to manage forests
70. Chambers, supra note 52 at 12.
71. See Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct.CI. 1975); Quinalt Allottee
Ass'n v. United States, 485 F.2d 1391 (Ct.Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974); Capoeman
v. United States, 440 F.2d 1002 (Ct.Cl. 1971).
72. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980); Coast Indian Community v. United
States, 550 F.2d 639 (Ct.CI. 1977); Navajo Tribe v. United States, 364 F.2d 320 (Ct.Cl. 1966);
Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. United States, 174 Ct.CI. 483 (1966).
73. Mitchell 1I, 103 S. Ct. at 2972-2973.
74. Id.
75. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980).
76. Id. at 541.
77. Id. at 542-543.
78. Id. at 543.
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located on allotment land. 9 Congress simply "wished to prevent alienation of the land and to ensure that allottees would be immune from state
taxation. "80
The Court of Claims and the Supreme Court in Mitchell II found that
the timber management statutes, the various federal statutes governing
rights-of-way, Indian funds and government fees, and the regulations
promulgated under these statutes impose a fiduciary duty upon the United
States for management of forests on allotted lands. Courts have long
recognized that "where the Federal Government takes on or has control
or supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship
normally exists with respect to such monies or properties (unless Congress
has provided otherwise) even though nothing is said expressly in the
authorizing or underlying statute (or other fundamental document) about
a trust fund, or a trust or fiduciary connection."'" In this instance, the
timber management statutes and regulations, and the various federal statutes governing rights-of-way, Indian funds and government fees were
intended by Congress to create a trust relationship and impose a fiduciary
responsibility on the United States to manage forests located on allotted
land.82
The Mitchell II test is met if this fiduciary obligation imposed by the
statute resembles that of a common law trust. The elements of a common
law trust are present if there is: (1) a trustee, who holds the trust property
and is subject to equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of another;
(2) a beneficiary, to whom the trustee owes equitable duties to deal with
the trust property for the beneficiary's benefit; and (3) trust property,
which is held by the trustee for the beneficiary.8 3 The Mitchell II Court
found that a common law trust existed between the federal government
and Indians over the exploited forests on the allotted lands because the
government assumed such elaborate control over forests and property
belonging to the Indians.' Federal officials determined what blocks (units)
of timber would be put up for sale, secured powers of attorney from the
allottee owners, and handled every detailed aspect of the sale-including
advertising for bids; letting contracts; and supervising the loggers who
built the roads, cut the timber, and hauled it off.85 Federal officials saw
to the counting and grading of logs, collected the money, deducted the
fee, and credited the balance to the allottee's (or the Tribe's) BIA ac79. Id. at 543-546.
80. Id. at 544.
81. Navajo Tribe v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (Ct.CI. 1980).
82. Mitchell II, 103 S. Ct. at 2971-2972.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
84. Mitchell II, 103 S. Ct. at 2972.
85. Brief for Respondents at 5-6, United States v. Mitchell, U.S.
(1983).

-,

103 S. Ct. 2961
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counts.8 6 The Indians had nothing to do with the entire operation, except
to sign the initial powers of attorney and to receive payment."7
The fiduciary obligation imposed by the statutes and regulations at
issue in Mitchell II was "interpreted as mandating compensation by the
Federal Government for damages sustained."I 8 The Court reasoned that
the government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary
duties.89 The Indians asserted that,
an express trust is indistinguishable from ... an express contract.
Just as there is no need for a federal government contract to spell
out expressly that the Government may be sued in damages for breach
of contract-since, without such liability, the contract is no contract
at all-so too, it is unnecessary for an express trust instrument to
spell out that the Government may be sued in damages for breaches
of its terms.'
The Mitchell I Court found that the federal government should be
liable in money damages for breaches of standards applicable to a private
fiduciary, when the government is responsible for the management of
Indian property and then violates that duty by mismanaging the property. 91
Equitable remedies are totally inadequate in this instance because, "absent
a retrospective damages remedy, there would be little to deter federal
officials from violating their trust duties." 9 2 Also the damage to Indian
resources may be so severe that any prospective remedy may be next to
worthless. 93 Unless the government is held liable in damages for mismanagement of Indian property and resources, a trusteeship means little
because the beneficiaries are precluded from meaningful recovery for
their losses.94
The dissent in Mitchell II found that the statutes did not contain any
"provision . . . that expressly makes the United States liable, 95 nor any
indication in the legislative history of the statutes that Congress intended
to consent to damages for government mismanagement of Indian forest
resources and their proceeds.96 Whether a private right of action should
be inferred from a statute is determined by congressional intent, not by
whether the Supreme Court thinks it can improve upon the statutory
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2973.
Id.
Brief for Respondents at 29-30, Mitchell 11.
Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2973.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2975.
Id.
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scheme that Congress enacted into law.97 The statutes must "unambiguously" impose fiduciary responsibilities on the government.9 8
The dissent then challenged the Court's conclusion that because the
statutes establish fiduciary obligations on the government, they can be
interpreted as mandating compensation by the government for damages
sustained. Justice Powell states,
there is a kind of a bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the
United States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee, and,
therefore, we may look at SCOTT ON TRUSTS or the RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS and impose on [the Government] all the other
consequences the law, as stated by those authorities, derives from
the status of an erring nongovernmental trustee. 99
Justice Powell went on to state how the label of a trust will change the
federal government's control over Indian affairs. State governments may
now intrude in those areas where at one time they were not allowed to
interfere. The Court has invoked the fiduciary relationship primarily (1)
to preclude unauthorized state interference in federal-Indian relations or
other unauthorized exercise of state jurisdiction on Indian lands; (2) to
bar or nullify exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters affecting
Indian property joined or represented; (3) to interpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language in favor of the Indians; (4) to determine the liability
of the United States for damages under the Just Compensation Clause
where, acting as a fiduciary manager, it has converted the form of Indian
property; and (5) to emphasize the high standard of care that the United
States is obliged to exercise in carrying out its duties respecting the
Indians." "The Court today turns this shield into a sword."' 0'1
PROBABLE EFFECTS OF MITCHELL H DECISION
Mitchell II requires a review of the statutes and regulations at issue in
a breach of trust claim against the federal government for mismanagement
of Indian land and resources. The purpose and legislative history of
statutes determine whether the statutes "clearly establish" the fiduciary
relationship between the federal government and Indians with respect to
the Indian lands and resources. The statutes need not contain the elaborate
statutory and regulatory schemes established by Congress in the timber
management statutes and regulations. There must be, however, some
indication that Congress intended the federal government to manage and
97. Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2976.
98. Id. at 2977.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2978.
101. Id.
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operate the Indian land and resources at issue, and be responsible to the
Indians when it fails to perform those duties.
Statutes such as the General Allotment Act and the Indian Reorganization Act do not impose such duties on the United States. 2 Congress
intended the Indians to manage the Indian lands and resources, not the
United States."o3 Congress limited the scope of the fiduciary relationship
between the United States and the Indians when it passed these Acts. No
breach of trust can be found when Congress simply intended to prevent
the alienation of Indian lands and did not intend the United States to be
liable as104a fiduciary for the mismanagement of Indian lands and re-

sources.

The amount of control the Government assumes over the management
and operation of Indian lands and resources pursuant to the relevant
statutes is important in determining whether a trust relationship has been
created. When Government control is exercised over Indian property and
resources, the trust relationship exists unless Congress has expressly provided otherwise."0 5 If the Indian property is generally run by the Indians
themselves and the Government makes management decisions only when
required by law,"° previous court decisions have found that no trust
relationship exists. 7 Mitchell H suggests that if Congress intended to
make the Government liable for certain management decisions and the
Government assumes control over the management of the Indian property,
then the Government may be held accountable for the mismanagement
of the Indian property in relation to its decision.'
The Mitchell II Court liberally construed the statutes at issue. One of
the canons in Indian law is that treaties and other federal actions shall
be liberally construed to favor Indians."0 9 Previous court decisions have
102. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980) (General Allotment Act); Hydaburg v. United States,
667 F.2d 64, 69 (Ct.Cl. 1981) (Indian Reorganization Act).
103. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. 535, 543 (1980); Hydaburg v. United States, 667 F.2d 64, 65 (Ct.CI.
1981).
104. Mitchell !, 445 U.S. 535, 544 (1980); Hydaburg v. United States, 667 F.2d 64, 69 (Ct.Cl.
1981).
105. Navajo Tribe v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (Ct.CI. 1980).
106. E.g., Hydaburg v. United States, 667 F.2d 64, 65 (Ct.Cl. 1981). The Government made
management decisions only when the Indian corporation's salmon canneries were facing bankruptcy.
Governmental control over the Indian operations could not be established.
107. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980); Hydaburg v. United States, 667 F.2d 64, 69 (Ct.CI.
1981). A limited trust relationships was found that does not impose any duty upon the Government
to manage Indian resources.
108. Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2972.
109. E.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-432 (1943); Choate v. Trapp,
224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912); United States v. Walker River Irrig. Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 337 (9th Cir.
1939).
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construed statutes in this manner."' The Mitchell I Court applied a strict
standard of interpretation to the General Allotment Act and found the
language of the Act not sufficiently "unambiguous" to create even a
common law trust."'
After a statute has been found to establish a fiduciary relationship, the
next issue is whether the statute creates a substantive right to money
damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, addressed this part
of the Mitchell II test in Short v. United States." 2 In an action on appeal
against the United States by individual Indians seeking relief from alleged
discriminatory distribution of proceeds from timber sales on the Hoopa
Valley Reservation,"' the Court applied Mitchell II and found that the
1864 Act authorizing the establishment of the Reservation' and the
timber sales statute relating to unallotted lands" 5 established a fiduciary
relationship with the Indians living on the Reservation. The 1864 Act did
not restrict distribution of the monies to members of the Hoopa Valley
Tribe. The plaintiffs who qualified to share in the Reservations' timber
proceeds and other income have a right to sue for the parts of those funds
improperly
distributed to others or illegally withheld from those claim116
ants.
In relation to this part of the Mitchell II test, a liberal reading of the
statute is applied to determine whether the statute creates a substantive
right to damages. The Mitchell I Court insisted that even if specific trust
duties existed under the General Allotment Act, the statute must still be
read strictly to determine whether compensation, rather than equitable
relief, is appropriate."'
Statutes that create a fiduciary relationship do not always create a
substantive right to damages. The trust relationship created may be limited
like the one found in Mitchell I. The federal government may "hold the
land or resource in trust for the benefit of the Indian," but the land or
resource may be under the management of the Indian or the tribe. The
110. E.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665
(1912).
111. Mitchell 1,445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980).
112. 719 F.2d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
113. The Reservation located in California is made up of unallotted forest lands.
114. The Act of April 8, 1864, ch. 48, 13 Stat. 39.
115. 25 U.S.C. §407 (1982).
116. Short, 719 F.2d at 1137-1138.
117. MitchellL,445 U.S. 535,542(1980). "We need not consider whether, had Congress actually
intended the General Allotment Act to impose upon the Government all fiduciary dutues ordinarily
placed by equity up a trustee, the Act would constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. We conclude
that the Act created only a limited trust relationship between the United States and the allottee that
does not impose any duty upon the Government to manage timber resources." Id. at 542.
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land or resource at issue must be reviewed to determine the federal
government's role in the management of the property.
An express trust was established by the statutes in Mitchell H. Government and executive officials must now adhere to the ordinary standards
of a private fiduciary when an express trust has been established." 8 As
a private fiduciary, the federal government is now accountable to Indians
and Indian tribes for any loss or depreciation in the value of the trust
estate resulting from the breach of trust, or any profit made by it through
the breach of trust, or any profit which would have accrued to the trust
estate if there had been no breach of trust." 9 Federal officials may also
be accountable for a breach of duty of loyalty, 20 for any interest incurred
on trust junds received,' for selling property which it is their duty to
retain,' 22 for failing to sell property which it is their duty to sell,' 2 3 for
purchasing property which it is their duty not to purchase,' 24 and for
failing to purchase property which it is their duty to purchase. 2 ' A federal
official, however, is not liable for a loss resulting from a breach of trust
if the same loss would have been incurred if he had committed no breach
of trust. 26
Lower court decisions have found that the general law of fiduciary
relationships can be utilized to the extent appropriate.27
This does not mean, however, that all the rules governing the relationship between private fiduciaries and their beneficiaries and accountings between them necessarily apply in full vigor in an accounting
claim by an Indian tribe against the United States. We refer to such
rules as the principal that once a breach of fiduciary duty is merely
charged (without any supporting material), the beneficiary is entitled
to recover unless the fiduciary affirmatively establishes that it properly discharged its trust, and the theory that failure to render the
precise form of accounting required may be sufficient, in and of
itself, to establish liability. In each situation, the precise scope of
the fiduciary obligation of the United States and any liability for
118. Mitchell II, 103 S. Ct. at 2972. "Given the existence of a trust relationship, it naturally
follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties. It is
well established that a trustee is accountable in damages for breaches of trust." Id. at 2973. The
Court then lists treatises on the law of trusts and the Restatement.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §205 (1959).
120. Id. at §206.
121. Id. at § 207.
122. Id. at § 208.
123. Id. at § 209.
124. Id. at § 210.
125. Id. at §211.
126. Id. at §212.
127. Navajo Tribe v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 988 (Ct.Cl. 1981).
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breach of that obligation must be determined in light of the relationships between the Government and the particular tribe.'28
The standard of duty, however, for the United States as trustee for
Indians is not mere "reasonableness," but the highest of fiduciary standards. 9 When a federal official fails to disclose adequately to the Indians
their statutory rights to water-carried sewage systems or the limits on
Congressional funds provided for pretermination services, a breach of
trust has occurred. 3 0 When a governmental agency's distribution plan's
agreement on the Indian's water supplies was so vague and uncertain,
and so unlikely to fulfill the Congressional objective, which was to grant
the Indians self-sufficiency by making their lands "livable and agriculturally viable," as to breach the trustee's duty of fair dealing, a serious
breach of trust has occurred under the standards of Mitchell IL 3'
The federal government has been accorded wide-ranging discretion to
manage trust property.'32 Federal officials have had to balance private
Indian property rights against public purposes and determine what Indian
33
property would be appropriated for public use without compensation. 34
Private trust law does not allow the trustee to have this much discretion. 1
Under the Mitchell II standards, the court will have to review the relevant
statutes at issue and determine whether Congress intended the United
States to be liable as a fiduciary for what may appear as mismanagement
of Indian property. If the relevant statute does not impose such a duty
upon the United States, then no breach of trust will be found.
Statutes often impose dual responsibilities on federal and executive
officials. One agency may be responsible for protecting the Indian interests
and another agency within the same department responsible for someone35
else's interests. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Nevada v. United States,
stated that the federal government may not be held to the "fastidious
standards of a private fiduciary, who would breach its duties to his single
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973); Duncan v. United States,
667 F.2d 36, 45 (Ct.CI. 1981); Coast Indian Community v.United States, 550 F.2d 1390, 1392
(Ct.CI. 1975); Mancester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D.
Cal. 1973).
130. Duncan, 667 F.2d at45.
131. Id.
132. CHAMBERS, supra note 52, at15.
133. CHAMBERS, supra note 52, at16.
134. CHAMBERS, supra note 52, at15.
135. U.S. -_,103 S.Ct. 2906 (1983). Nevada v. UnitedStates involved an action instituted
by the Government seeking additional water rights to the Truckee River for the Pyramid Lake Indian
Reservation. The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe intervened inthe action. The Court held that
resjudicata
prevented the United States and the Tribe from adjudicating the instant claim because all of the
parties are found by the OrrDitch decree. The United States, as a party to the Orr Ditch litigation
acting as a representative for the interests of the Reservation and the Project, could not relitigate
the Reservation's water rights.
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beneficiary solely by representing potentially conflicting interests without
the beneficiary's consent."' 36 When a statute imposes a fiduciary obligation on the United States to represent Indians as well as perform a
specific duty, no breach may be alleged when "Congress has decreed
that the Government have dual responsibilities."' 37
The finding of a breach of a fiduciary responsibility mandates compensation. 38
' Damages have been limited, however, to direct damages.' 39
No consequential or indirect damages have been awarded."4 Courts have
stated that the full panoply of damages applicable in a private trust suit
are not applicable in an Indian breach of trust suit."'4 In the absence of
some indication of Congressional authorization and without statutory or
common law standards of trustee duty and of compensation, courts cannot
discover any mandate for compensation other than direct damages.' 42
This seems inadequate in view of the fact that the tribe's natural resources have been completely depleted by the time litigation is completed.
If equitable relief is available before the Indian's resources are completely
depleted, a claim for monetary damages may be avoided.
Equitable remedies are still available in those situations that warrant
such relief. Generally a trust beneficiary possesses five equitable remedies
against the federal government as a private trustee: (1) specific enforcement of the duties of the trustee under the trust; (2) injunctive relief
against a threatened breach of trust; (3) redress for breach of trust; (4)
the appointment of a receiver; and (5) the removal of the trustee. 143 The
third is the most common cause of action. The fourth and fifth are inappropriate for the fiduciary relationship that exists between the United
States and the Indians. The first and second seem the more appropriate
causes of action when the federal government has clearly or is about to
breach one of its fiduciary responsibilities. The Mitchell II Court found
that injunctive relief was totally inadequate in that instance and damages
a more appropriate remedy.
If the courts allow a broader spectrum of remedies, this may perhaps
motivate the Government to fulfill its role as a trustee to the Indians more
136. 103 S. Ct. at 2917.
137. Id. at 2973.
138. Id.
139. The Court of Claims, on remand, limited damages to direct damages in United States v.
Mitchell.
140. The Indians in Duncan v. United States claimed damages for injury to Indian culture and
subsequent emotional and psychological injuries.
141. See, e.g., Amer. Indians Residing on the Maricopa-Ak Chin Reservation v. United States,
667 F.2d 980 (Ct.C1. 1981); Navajo Tribe v. United States, 624 F.2d 981 (Ct.CI. 1980).
142. Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36, 48 (Ct.Cl. 1981).
143. A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 199 (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 199 (1959);
G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 519-28, 543 (v), 861, 945-46 (rev. ed. 1978).
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prudently. Tribal lands and resources may then be better used as sources
that allow Indians to live out their lives as they wish.
CONCLUSION
The Mitchell II decision sets forth a test which courts will use to
determine if a breach of trust has occurred and if monetary damages may
be awarded. This decision broadens the federal government's trust responsibility to Indian tribes to include tribal natural resources like timber,
and clarifies that the Government may be liable for damages.
ANTOINETTE G. HOULE

